The Third Part of Logick
Wherein is considered the nature of discourse or argumentation &c.
Cap. 1. Of Reasoning, discourse or argumentation.
We now come to the third operation of the mind, or discourse which is the inferring of one axiome from another: for to reason or discourse is nothing else but to know one thing from another being known, and there reasoning is the knowledge of one thing deduced from the knowledge of another; as when a man inferrs Cællum esse extensum from this that everybody is extended.
Whence, as Judgment or the second operation of the mind adds assertion to the first, so Reasoning or the third operation adds, to the second, deduction or illation.
In every argumentation or discourse 2 things specially are to be attended to, viz the question or thing proposed, and the argument or reason to prove.
Hence an argumentation or reasoning consists of 2 parts, the Antecedent & the consequent, or in the words of the schooles, the part inferring and the part inferred: that is propos’d or promis’d, this follows, and is gathered from what proceeded; as when it is said, Angelus est Immaterialis, igitur est indivisibilis; for the former sentence has the notion of an Antecedent, and the latter of a consequent.
If the Antecedent is not more known and certain then the consequent, it will by no means attain it’s end of arguing.
There are 3 propositions contained in an argumentation:
The first is called the Major, in which the major term is disposed with the medium and is put in the first place in a syllogism; whence by many (in way of eminence) it is called Propositio, in that it is proposed as the foundation of the whole argumentation.
The second is called the minor, in which the less term is disposed with the medium and placed in the second place in a syllogism. By some it is called Assumptio because it is as it were assumed for aid to infer the 3d Proposition.
The third is called conclusio, in which the major and minor terms are disposed: some term it illatio and consequatio in that it follows upon and is inferred from what went before, by force of the illative, ergò, igitur, &c.
The 2 former propositions in an argumentation are called the premises, because they do preceed the conclusion which necessarily follows from them if the syllogism be perfect; for it cannot be that the premises being true, the conclusion should be false: yet there is no need that in every argumentation the premises be expressed, for somtimes one alone may suffice that the understanding may perceive (at least confusedly) two propositions: for he that from this Antecedent, omnis lapis est corpus dos deduce this consequent, Adamas est corpus, did know it in the Antecedent in which it is Implicitly contain’d; and he that from this that, corpus est Substantia, does inferr that Adamas est Substantia, by knowing it to be a body does likewise know it to be A substance.
Every perfect syllogism consists of 3 Ideas, the Idea, which is the subject of the proposition, which is called minor terminus, because the subject is less extended than the predicate: 2. The Idea, which is the predicate otherwise called major Terminus, because more extended than the subject.
3. The medium, or Idea which is found twice in the premises and which connects the 2 Ideas, as in this argumentation.
omnis substantia intellectualis est cogitans
mens est substantia intellectualis,
igitur mens est cogitans.53
It’s evident that Substantia intellectualis is the middle term, that cogitans is the greater term, and that mens is the lesse term.
Argumentation in generall is divided into perfect and Imperfect:—perfect is a syllogism consisting of 3 propositions whose form is exact and most apt to persuade: for syllogism is nothing else but an internal speech or discourse of mind whereby out of 2 propositions laid down, {a third more} unknown is deduced, for if to this Proposition Saturnus est planeta, you add this omnes planetæ à sole lucem mutuantur you may deduce a third viz. Saturnus igitur à sole lucem mutuatur. Imperfect is an Enthymem, Induction, example, dilemma, and sorites whose form is less accurate, and less accomodated to perswade.
Cap. 2. Of Simple Syllogisms, both complex and incomplex. Syllogisms are either Simple or conjoyn’d.
Simple syllogisms are such as consist of simple propositions, or, those in which the middle term is at once conjoyn’d only with one of the terms of the conclusion.
Conjoyn’d, are such in which the middle term is at once coupled with both the terms of the conclusion. Thus this syllogism is simple.
omnis bonus princeps à subditis diligitur
omnis rex pius est bonus princeps, Ergò
omnis rex pius à subditis diligitur.54
Because the middle term is only separately conected with the subject of the conclusion [Rex pius] and with the predicate of it [diligitur à subditis]
But the following Syllogism for the contrary reason is is conjunct.
Si regnum electivum factionibus obnoxium sit, non est diuturnum
Sed regnum electivum factionibus obnoxium sit, Ergò
Regnum electivum non est diuturnum.55
Simple syllogism are of 2 kinds, viz, Incomplex or complex.
Clear or Incomplex syllogisms are those in which each term of the conclusion is entirely {connected} with the middle term; i.e. with the whole predicate in the major and with the whole Subject in the minor.
Implicite or complex syllogisms are such, in which the subject or predicate of a complex conclusion is only in part connected with the middle term in one of the premises, the remainder being conjoyn’d with the other proposition in the premises, as in this Syllogism.
Lex divina jubet ut Reges honoremus.
Ludovicus XIV est Rex, Ergò
Lex divina jubet ut Ludovicum XIV honoremus56
These are called complex, not as if all syllogisms wherein complex propositions are contained are complex syllogisms, but because none do belong to this kind in which complex propositions are not found.
These Syllogisms are more usual then Incomplex ones which are seldom or never used, but in the schooles, and althô at first sight they may seem to deviate from the rules of the figures, yet they will appear true, when they are Reduced to incomplex syllogisms: for this syllogism
Scriptura Imperat ut medicos honoremus.
Fernelius est medicus, ergò
Scriptura Imperat, ut Fernelium honoremus.57
Althô it be in the Second figure seemingly, yet the term medicus which is the medium is not properly the Attribute or predicate in this axiome, althô it be united with the Attribute, Imperat, for that which is truly the attribute is affirmed and does agree; whereas medicus is neither affirmed of nor does agree to, Scriptura; the whole argument is plainly in those propositions.
Medici sunt honorandi
Fernelius est medicus, Ergò
Fernelius est honorandus.
and therefore this proposition (Scriptura Imperat) which before was accounted as the principal proves to be only Incident to the argumt being proposed only as a proof thereof; Whence it is manifest that this argument belongs to the first figure and is found in barbara; the term Fernelius being a singular name and so to have the force of an universal, as what were taught in the doctrine of propositions.
Cap. 3. of the figures and modes of Syllogism.
Something having been said as to the matter of simple Syllogisms, it remains that the form thereof be taken into consideration.
The form of a Syllogism is the lawfull disposition of the medium with the parts of the question which consists in these 2 things, viz: 1. that the middle term be suitably disposed with the extremes, i.e. the major and minor: & 2—that the propositions be duely described according to their quantity and quality; i.e. universality and singularity; affirmation & negation.
The first disposition of the terms i.e. of the medium with the 2 terms of the conclusion, is called, the figure.
The second which is the description of the 3 Propositions according to these 4 differences a. e. i. o. is called the mode or mood.
So that, as the figure respects the remote matter of the syllogism, viz. the 3 terms in it, i.e. the medium and the 2 extremes: so the mode respects the next matter of it, viz, the 3 Propositions—Major, minor & conclusion.
The figures of Syllogism are usually accounted 3: (Ars cogitandi, makes 4.)58
The first figure is, when the middle term is the subject in the Major Proposition, & the predicate in the minor.
The Second figure is, when the middle term is the predicate in each of the premises; i.e. in the Major and minor.
The Third figure is, when the middle term is the subject in each of the premises.
The modes of Syllogism are commonly accounted 19 but may be reduced to 14 which we may include in the following verses.
Barbara, Cælarent, Primæ: Darii, Ferioque.
Cæsare, Camæstres, Festino, Særne, Secundæ.
Tertia, Darapti Sibi vendicat, atque Felapton.
Adjungens disamis, datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.59
The modes of the first figure are called direct and perfect, bee: all kinds of Questions, both affirmative and negative, universal and particular may be concluded by it: whereas in the second, only negations; and in the Third only particulars can be inferred.
In all the Artificial names proposed in the 4 verses, there are 3 syllables whereof the first denotes the major, the second the minor, and the Third the conclusion: and the vowel of every syllable signifies of what kind, the Proposition is; For A argues the Proposition to be universal affirmative; E, to be universal negative; I, particular affirmative; & lastly O, denotes the Proposition to be particular negative; According to the forementioned distick.
Asserit A, negat E, verum generaliter ambæ
Asserit I, negat O, Sed particulariter ambæ.
And for the further elucidating the nature & meaning of these figures and modes, We shall annex examples of the several modes of every figure.
The several modes of the first figure.
- Bar—omni corpus est extensum
- ba—omni saxum est corpus, Ergò
- ra—omne saxum est extensum.60
- Cæ—nullus modus est substantia,
- la—omnis figura est modus, Ergò
- rent—nulla figura est substantia.
- Da—omni quad movetur, ab alio movetur,
- ri—quoddam corpus movetur, Ergò
- i—quoddam corpus ab alio movetur.
- Fe—nullus spiritus est materialis,
- ri—aliqua substantia est spiritus, Ergò
- o—aliqua substantia non est materialis.61
The several modes of the second figure.
- Cæ—nullus Lapis est planta,
- Sa—omnis quercus est planta, Ergò
- re—nullum quercus est Lapis.62
- Cam—omni corpus est in infinitum divisibile,
- Est—nullum punctum est in infinitum divisibile, Ergò
- res—nullum punctum est corpus.
- Fes—nullus usurarius Salvabitur,
- ti—quidam Judæus est Usurarius
- no—quidam Judæa non Salvabitur63
- Ba—omne universale est pluribus communicabile.
- ro—quædam natura non est pluribus communicabilis,
- co—quædam natura non est universalis.
The several modes of the Third figure.
- Da—omne corpus est in infinitum divisibile,
- rap—omne corpus est Substantia, Ergò
- ti—aliqua Substantia est in infinitum divisibilis.64
- Fe—nullus Angelus loco circumscribitur,
- lap—omnis Angelus est quid finitum, Ergò
- ton—aliquid finitum nullo loco circumscribitur.
- Di—aliquis numerus potest augeri,
- sa—omnis numerus est rerum affectio, Ergò
- mis—aliqua rerum affectio potest augeri.
- Da—Quisquis deo servit, Rex est,
- ti—aliquis Servit Deo, qui pauper est, Ergò
- si—aliquis pauper Rex est.
- Bo—aliqua Stultitia non est vituperabilis,
- car—omnis Stultitia est recta rationis defectus, Ergò
- do—aliquis recta rationis defectus non est vituperabilis.
- Fe—nullum corpus grave sponte deorsum tendit
- ri—aliquod corpus grave est materia, Ergò
- son—aliqua materia non sponte deorsum tendit
Cap. 4. Of some gen: rules of Syllogisms.
Since any conclusions cannot be deduced from all premises, it is requisite that some common rules or laws be proposed which are to be observ’d in all syllogisms.
The first Rule.
The Medium ought to be distributed; or the middle term cannot be taken particularly twice, but once at least must be universal.
Because if the medium be taken twice particularly, it may then be taken according to different parts of the same totum and so nothing (at least) necessarily be concluded; for it is sufficient to argue an argument vicious, that the conclusion drawn from the premises might have been false, since (as we have heard) the syllogism only is to be accounted good whose conclusion so necessarily flows from the premises, that it cannot but be true.
The Second Rule
Out of mere negatives nothing can be concluded.
The reason is, because two negative propositions do separate the subjt from the medium, and the predicate from the same medium; for from this, that two things are separated from a third thing, It does not follow that these 2 are or that they are not the same thing themselves as now, from this, quòd mens non est corpus, et corpus non est perceptionis capax It does not follow quòd mens est perceptionis capax.65
The Third Rule
The extremes of the conclusion must not be taken more universally, then they were taken in the premises.
Hence if either of the extremes be taken universally in the conclusion, the syllogism of necessity will be false, if that it was taken particularly in the 2 former propositions:—the Reason of this rule is deduced from the first rule, viz because, to argue to an universal from a particular is unlawfull: for from this, Quòd aliquis homo sit vino deditus, it cannot be inferred Quòd omnis homo sit vino deditus.66
The fourth Rule
The conclusion must always follow the weaker part that is; if either of the premises be negative, the conclusion ought likewise to be negative; and if either of the premises be particular, the conclusion also must be particular.
The reason of this rule is, bec: a negative Proposition being given, the medium is removed from one of the extremes of the conclusion, and therefore can by no means connect them, which is required to conclude affirmatively: And if any proposition be particular, an universal conclusion cannot be deduced from it; bee: if the universal conclusion be affirmative, the medium since it is universal, ought also to be universal in the assumption or lesse proposition; and then it should be the subject of it, since an attribute or affirmative Proposition is never taken universally; therefore the medium conjoyn’d with this subject will be particular in the minor: therefore it must be universal in the major, otherwise there would be a particular twice: therefore it will be the subject, and thence that major will also be universal; and so there cannot be an affirmative particular proposition in an argumentation, whose conclusion may be universal.
Cap. 5. Of conjunct or compound Propositions.
Those syllogisms are called conjunct which have each or at least one proposition conjunct: for it is not necessary to the constituting a compound syllogism, that it should consist of 2 conjunct Propositions, but only that it’s major proposition be so compounded as to include in it the whole conclusion: but now since the major proposition of such a syllogism may be four fold, viz. conditional, copulative, Disjunct, & analogical.
Conditional syllogisms are those in which the major proposition is conditional and contains in it the whole conclusion; As.
Si mens humana sit corporea, potest dividi in partes
atqui mens humana non potest dividi in partes, Ergò
mens humana non est corporea.67
The major consists of 2 Propositions, the first being the Antecedent (simens humana sit corporea) the second being the consequent, (potest dividi inpartes).
There is a 2 fold figure of conditional syllogisms
The first figure is.
When in the minor proposition being simple; the Antecedent of the major is so placed, as that it is made the consequent of it in the conclusion, as in this Syllogism.
Si omnia create per se subsistere nequeunt, necesse est ut a Deo con serventur,
alqui omnia creata per se subsistere {nequeunt ergo}
necess: est ut à Deo conserventur.68
And this argument rests on this maxime; posito Antecedente, ponitur et consequens.69
The second figure is
When the consequent of the same major Proposition is taken away, that the Antecedent may be removed. As
This kind of argument is founded on this maxim, Sublato Antecedente, tollitur et Consequens. Ponere, is to affirm the Antecedent which was affirmed, and to deny the Antecedent which was denyed: and on the contrary remove is to affirm the consequent which was denied, or to deny the conseqt which was affirmed.
Conditional arguments may be vitiated 2 ways: 1. when a false conclusion is deduced from a true Major: when to wit the Antecedent is inferred from the conseqt; as when one argues
2. when the negation of a conseqt: is inferred from the negation of the Antecedent, as in the forementioned example.
Si Lapis est vivens, est Substantia,
Sed Lapis non est vivens, Ergò
Lapis non est Substantia.
Copulative syllogisms are only of one kind viz. when a copulative negative proposition being assumed afterwards one part is placed [ponitur] to take away the other part, as
non potest unum corpus planum simul esse et rotundum
sed terra est rotunda, Ergò
terra non est plana.72
Disjunct syllogisms are those whose first proposition is disjunctive: i.e. whose parts are connected by Vel, or Aut. as
mors homini Accidit, vel anima vitio, vel corporis,
sed non accidit anima vitio, Ergò
accidit corporis vitio.73
There are 2 figures of disjunct syllogisms
The first figure is,
When one part is put that the other may be removed: [ponitur, ut tollatur &c:] as in the formentioned example.
The Second Figure is
When one part is taken away, that the other may be placed as here.
qui primò nobis retulerunt dari Antipodes, verum dicebant, aut
nobis Imponebant,
sed illi verum dicebant. Ergò
nobis non Imposuerunt.74
A disjunct syllogism is grounded on this principle; viz: duo contradictoria simul esse vera non posse.75
Analogical (or proportional) syllogisms are when the proposition which is in the Major, is protracted or dilated which happens when the Consequents in the minor being accounted as Antecedents are further referred to other consequents; as when it is said, Ita se habent 2 ad 4.sicut 3 ad 6. Ita se habent 4 ad 8. ut 6. ad 12. Ergo Se habent 2 ad 8.sicut 3. ad 12.76 and because the relates are the media with which the extremes do agree therefore hence it may be inferr’d that the extremes do agree among themselves.
Cap. 6. of Imperfect Argumentations.
Imperfect Argumentations receive their denomination not on account of the matter out of which they are compounded, but of their form which is less accurate and in comparison of a syllogism less disposed and digested: for in these argumentations, the Antecedent consists only of one proposition whether simple or complex; and such argumentations are Enthymema, Inductio, Exemptum, Sorites et dilemma.
Enthymem is an argumentation in which only one of the premises is expressed, the other being undiscovered; which yet if any one should add, would constitute a perfect syllogism: as here
for by adding the Major it becomes a syllogism, thus
Quicunq Salvare valet, valet et perdere.
Sed ego te liberare valui, Ergò et perdere.77
Induction is an argumentation by which from the reckoning up many singulars, some universal is concluded; as
hic Triangulus comprehenditur tribus lineis, et iste triangulus
comprehenditur tribus lineis, et ita de cæteris, Igitur omnis
triangulus comprehenditur tribus lineis.78
Here it is requisite that the enumeration be made of all the species or parts, for if any one is wanting, the proposition will be denied.
Example is an Imperfect Argumentation whereby from one syllogism singular, by reason of a like respect between them, another Singular is inferred as when from this, that
Cæar magis clementiâ quàm armis populum Romanum abstrinxit, I gather Principem magis ad clementiam quàm ad arma debere recurrere, ut Subditos sibi devinciat.79
Sorites is an argumentation consisting of many propositions so disposed, that the predicati of the Precedent Proposition becomes the subject of the following one: and thence the last predicate in the conclusion must be given to the first Subject, as here
Avari multa concupiscunt; qui multa concupiscunt, plurimis {rebus} indigent; qui plurimus rebus indigent sunt miseri; Igitur avari sunt miseri.80
N.B. This argument dos not conclude the truth, unless when what is spoken of the Attributes is also said of the subject; thus this argument is not good.
Caro salsa ad bibendum excitat; bibendo situs extinguitur; ergo caro salsa sitim extinguit.81
because saltness in flesh does not excite to drink only by Accident, in as much as it causes a certain dryness in the throat which calls for moisture.
Dilemma is from a disjunction of many Prepositions opposite amongst themselves whereby the Respondent is put to a stand which part so ever he looks upon & considers of as when a man argues against another for acting some wickedness.
Aut Scivisti te in Regem deliquisse aut non; Si Scivisti, qui ausus es majestatis Legem violare? si non, cur patrato Scelere, te in pedes conjecisti?82
A Dilemma maybe vitiated 2 ways; 1. when the disjunctive proposition (on which the dilemma is founded) does not contain in it all the members of the dividend. As, if one should thus argue against marriage.
Aut uxor ducenda, pulchra est aut deformis, si pulchra, Zelotypiam pariet; si deformis, displicebit. Ergò uxor non est ducenda.83
for there are some women, quæ non adeò formosæ ut Zelotypiam in maritum inducant; and yet no adeò deformes ut displiceant.84 2. when the particular conclusions of any part are not necessary: Thus; It is not necessary that a beautifull woman should cause jealousie in her husband since she may be so prudent and chast as to give full assurance of honesty to her husband: and likewise it is not necessary, that a deformed wife should be ungratefull to her husband, since she may be so endued with other virtues and qualifications as abundantly to compensate what she wants in that respect.
He that uses a dilemma ought to take heed lest it prove such an one as may be retorted on him to prove the quite contrary to what it was brought to prove: Thus when Romulus (who drank but little wine) was told that if all men should drink as he did wine would be cheap: to whom he answered; no, if all men should drink as I do wine would be dear, for I drink as much as I will:—this is termed by some a volentum, but properly may be reduced to a dilemma.
Cap: 7: of Syllog: Apodictical, topical & Sophistical
Having heretofore spoken of the matter & form of syllogism, it remains that we now consider it as to it’s end and use: and since the design of a syllogism is to beget knowledge, opinion, or error, hence it is divided into Apodictical, (which respects knowledge) Topical, (which respects opinion) and Sophistical (which designs error and deceit.)
That what is to be said concerning these several sorts of syllogisms may the better be understood, it seems needfull first to explain the nature of science, opinion, error, and faith.
Science is that certain and evident knowledge which we have of anything: for that which is so evident to us as that we are certain of it, we are said to know; wherefore that knowledge of a conclusion is certain & evident, when the premises, on which it depends as principles, are so.
Opinion is not plainly a certain knowledge, but is attended with a certain fear of wavering of the understanding in assenting, for, opinion is indeed a true assent, but doubtfull and uncertain.
Error is an opinion opposite to that which is true.
Faith is a persuasion grounded on the Testimony of another, which may be true or doubtfull according to the difference of the Authority on which it relyes: Thus, the faith which we have to God is most firm, because we know that he is true and cannot lye; but humane faith hath always something of uncertainty in it, since there is no man but can deceive if he will.
This Premised,
Demonstration (or Apodictical syllog:) is a syllogism consisting of true, Immediate and more known premises which are the causes of the conclusion, those propositions are said to be true and Immediate which cause faith by themselves and not by any other thing; or those things which are known from their own terms; as, Quod libet est, vel non est.85 for there is a power innate with us, whereby we do assent to first principles.
demonstration is 2 fold: first, a Priori, and proptor quid; Second a posteriori, et quia.
Demostration à priori (which only is simply demonstration) is that in which the effect is demonstrated by it’s cause, as when we prove the existence of light, by the existence of the Sun.
Demonstration a posteriori, is when the cause is demonstrated by the effect: as when by the existence of light, the existence of the Sun is shown.
Topical syllogism, (which is also termed suasorious86 and probable) is that which is concluded from probable premises: or, whose premises do not carry before them a necessity of connexion between the subject and medium, or medium and predicate: for althô A conclusion which it proves has more of evidence than of obscurity in it, yet it leaves something of hesitation and doubt behind it, whereby it comes to pass that the understanding cannot assent to it without a scruple: whence it is said, that a topical syllogism does indeed persuade, but does not force to an assent as demonstration does.
Probables are such axiomes as seem to all men, or the most of men, or the wisest of men, and of those to the most or choisest, to be true: Thus it seems probable to all men, that the Summer will be hot, yet it is not certain, since it sometimes happens to be cold in the Summer season, to many it seems probable, that medicine is necessary to cure diseases, when yet it oft times happens, either thrô the ignorance of the Physitian, or the difault of the sick person, or the ill temperament of the air, that the Physick does more hurt then good: Thus, wise men think that Learning is to be desired by all men; yet there are many who despise it: Lastly, it seems to the eminentest87 of men, that the earth is moved in a circle, and that the Sun stands still in the midst of the world, and yet many there are who despise this notion, and maintain the contrary.
Wherefore all those syllogisms whose premises are contingent, and argue no necessary connexion, between the subject and medium, or between the medium and predicate, are called topical or Probable
Sophistical, or paralogistical syllogism, is a discourse consisting of Propositions of none but only apparent truth: & bec: it consists of false propositions, It begets errour & deceit, for from such a cause such an effect is produced, as here
Omnes lineæ à puncto ad punctum ductæ sunt æqualis,
Sed linea recta et obliqua possunt ab eodem puncto duci ad idem punctum,
Ergò linea recta et obliqua sunt æquales.88
For althô this demonstration seems to be geometrical, and the præsmises to be necessary, yet are they false.
This fallacy arises 3 ways, either from the matter; as if one should say
Quicquid non amisisti, habes,
uxorum non amisisi, ergô, uxorum habes.89
The major here seems to be probable, when yet it is false. or from the form; As
For althô at first view the consequence seems to be legitimate, yet it is false, since this syllogism consists of 2 affirmative præmises and yet is found in the 2d figure, or from each; i.e. Matter and form; As
Quicquid non perdidisti, habes,
Sed pileum (quem semel amissum recuperâsti) habes, Ergò hunc pileum non amisisti.91
This argumentation neither consists of a probable Major, nor of a form suitable to conclude any thing, since it is contrary to the rules of the 2d figure:
Aristotle reckons 13 sorts of those fallacies, 6 being in the words themselves, and 7 in the sense of the words, but of this we have heard sufficiently elsewhere.
To Avoid those catches of fallacies there is no safer way, then to reduce the argt: to it’s due form, and to mind the medium whether it bears the same sense in the major proposition which it does in the minor: for thus the caviller will readily be discovered.
Ars Cogitandi reduces sophisms to nine heads, accounting all others so crasse and palpable, as to need noe caution against.92
The first sophism, is
To Prove Something That Is Aliene to the Question.
This sophism by Aristotle is termed ignoratio elenchi, i.e. the ignorance of that which is to be proved against the Adversary.
The second sophism, is
To Suppose That Which Is in the Question.
This by Aristotle is termed Petitio Principii.
The third sophism, is
To Assign Something for A Cause Which Is Not a Cause.
This sophism is called, non causa pro causâ, and is very usual.
The fourth sophism, is
An Imperfect Enumeration.
When we argue that this or that thing is not, bec: it is not this or that way, when as it may be several other wayes.
The fifth sophism, is
To Pronounce concerning a Thing, from Somthing That Agrees to it Only By Accident.
This sophism in the schooles is termed Fallacia Accidentis: an absolute conclusion and without all restriction is deduced from something that is true only accidentally.
The sixth sophism, is
To Argue from a Divided to a Compound Sense, or from a Compound Sense to a Divided One.
Of these sophisms one is termed, Fallacia divisionis the other Fallacia Compositionis: cæci vident, i.e. illi qui fuorunt cæci, et Iam non sunt, vident.93
The seventh sophism, is
To Argue from Something That Is True Secundum Quid, Something to be Simply True.94
In the schooles it is termed à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum Simplicitòr.
The Eighth Sophism, is
To Abuse the Ambiguity of Words.
Hither may be reduced all those syllogisms which labour under a fourth term.
The ninth Sophism, is
From a Vicious Induction to Inferre an Universal Conclusion.
Of all those heads Ars cogitandi treats at large in the nineteenth chapter of his third part.
Cap. 8. Of the places whence the medium is fetched.
The Places of Arguments, as they are called by Rhetoricians and Logicians, are certain generall heads, to which may be reduced those common proofs which we may use when treating on several things.
Ramus finds fault with Aristotle and the schoolmen for treating of these places after their having proposed Rules about argumentation.
He argues that the matter ought to be gathered together, before we think of disposing it, and therefore that whereas the deduction of those places does find out and heap together this matter, therefore it ought to preceed &c.
But Ramus’s argument is very weak; for althô it be necessary that the matter be found out before it be disposed, yet it is not necessary that we should learn to find out the matter, before we learn to dispose it; for here it is sufficient, if we have in readiness some general matter out of which examples may be formed; and this, the mind it self & common sense without the help of Art, may sufficiently help to: It is therefore true, that we ought to have matter before we propose the rules of syllogism; but also false, that this matter ought first to be found out by the places of arguments, or by the help of Art.
They that have treated of these places, have differently divided them.
The division which Cicero and Quintilian made is very Immethodical, thô accomodated to court orations which it especially looks at.
Ramus’s division does unprofitably trouble us with subdivisions.
Claubergius is most accurate, and therefore we shall keep to him in this chapter.95
Arguments are either fetched from Grammar, from Logick, or from Metaphysicks.
Grammatical Places.
Are taken either from Etymology; or from words derived from the same root, which by Latines are called conjugata and by Graecians παρώνυμα
Logical Places
Are taken from universalls, (Genus, Species, difference, Proprium et Accident) as also from definition and division. And here we may add some common axioms which, althô not very profitable, yet because commonly received and embraced, will not be needlessly proposed.
- 1. Quod affirmatur aut negatur de genere, affirmatur aut negatur de specie: As, Quæ in homines cadunt, etiam in potentes cadunt.96
- 2. destructo genore, destruitur species: As, Qui nunquam Judicat, iniqß non Judicat.97
- 3. destructis omnible, Specieble, distruitur Genus: Thus, formæ, dictæ substantiales (exceptâ animâ rationali) nec corpus sunt, nec Spiritus, Ergô non sunt substantia.98
- 4. Si de re quâlibet affirmari vel negari possit differentia totalis, negari vel affirmari potent Species: As, extensis non convenit cogitationi, Ergô ilia non est corpus.99
- 5. Si de re quâlibet affirmari vel negari possit proprium, affirmari vel negari poterit Species: thus cum Impossibile sit cogitationis medietatem Imaginari, vel cogitationem Sphæricam, vel quadratam, Impossible est, utilla sit corpus.100
- 6. affirmatur vel negatur definitum, de quo affirmatur vel negatur definitio: as, Pauci mutmuntur Justi, quia pauci sunt qui firmam stabiliunq voluntatum habent suum unicuiq reddendi.101
Metaphysical Places.
Are some general Attributes agreeable to all beings, unto which many arguments may be reduced, such as those that are taken à causa, effectu, Toto, Partibile, Oppositis,102 therefore add nothing further to this third part of Logick. next follows the fourth part of Logick.